



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

BOOK REVIEWS

Dogmatism and Evolution. By THEODORE DE LAGUNA and GRACE ANDRUS DE LAGUNA. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1910. pp. iv, 259.

The term dogmatism, as employed in the title of this work, is intended "to denote the body of logical assumptions which were generally made by thinkers of all schools, before the rise of theories of social and organic evolution. Its application is therefore wider than common usage would warrant. The empiricism of Berkeley and Hume, as well as the rationalism of Descartes and Leibniz, is included in its scope" (Preface). This usage of the term is sufficiently justified by the presentation. The authors aim to make prominent the fact that empiricism and rationalism, in spite of their wide divergences, are founded upon a common basis, and that this identity of assumption is more significant for present-day philosophy than are the differences. The fundamental dogma behind both standpoints is also present in the philosophy of Kant, and in absolute idealism. The pragmatic movement, moreover, which is principally a protest against these earlier philosophies, is to some extent misdirected, since it perpetuates in a measure this self-same dogma. It suffers further from the inevitable extravagances and overstatements pertaining to doctrines that express the irritation of a reaction; and hence, while it represents an important truth, it requires re-interpretation and correction.

In presentation the first two parts of the book in particular are not only compact and closely-reasoned, but coherent and lucid. The treatment of the subject-matter can lay claim to originality, and is splendidly stimulating and suggestive. Historical rationalism and empiricism differ in that the one makes an appeal to mathematics as its ideal of knowledge, while the other relies upon introspection. In spite of this contrast, however, they both assume that experience presents us with certain unanalyzable elements, which serve as the foundation for all further knowledge. In the case of rationalism, these simple elements are universal propositions possessing intuitive certainty; in the case of empiricism, they are particulars which are capable of entering into various combinations. Hence both encounter the same difficulty, for both are committed to the view that relations are external to their terms. This is obviously true of empiricism; but it is no less true of rationalism, for the relation of inclusion cannot obtain between simple concepts, and hence rationalism must take as its starting-point, not concepts, but judgments which are indemonstrable and synthetical. Spinoza, indeed, attempts to start with a concept in which all other concepts are implicit, viz., that of substance. But the exposition runs smoothly merely because the concept is at once completely simple (or indeterminate) and infinitely determined. Rationalism fails to justify either the synthetic character of its most fundamental judgments or the passage from a system of universal truths to the 'infinite determinations' of fact in which this system finds embodiment.

This result sets the problem for Kant. The fact, however, that 'synthetic *a priori* judgments' present a problem at all is due to the assumption, which Kant shares with his predecessors, that analysis must yield final elements. "No proposition could be determined as synthetic, unless a complete definition of its terms had exhibited their ultimate disparteness" (p. 73). In other words, Kant proceeds on the assumption that pure thought supplies to experience certain universal modes of relationship to

which every experience must be subject. This assumption persists in absolute idealism. At first sight, the contrast between rationalism and absolute idealism is as great as could well be imagined. The former made relations external; the latter asserts that "the essences of things are wholly constituted by their relations" (88). The procedure of rationalism is a descent from first premises; that of absolute idealism is an ascent of which the fundamental principle of the entire scheme is the goal. Yet absolute idealism, like rationalism, is committed to the proposition that "the order and connection of thoughts and the order and connection of things are the same" (108). It necessarily depends upon an inner dialectic for the movement of its self-contained system of thought, and hence it has to choose between the claim of being able to account antecedently for all the contingent facts of history, or else to accept existing irrational facts, and thus to admit an irreconcilable contradiction in its theory of actuality.

It appears, then, that rationalism, empiricism and absolute idealism are all dogmatic, in that they all proceed upon the basis of an untested assumption with regard to the 'simple elements' or constituents of experience. On the other hand, pragmatism bases itself upon evolution and endeavors to give a functional interpretation of logical and psychological problems. With this endeavor the authors profess themselves in sympathy. Their argument, however, is intended neither as a defense of pragmatism nor as an attack upon it, but as a justification of the charge that current pragmatism is "only half-free from the grip of the traditions which it openly repudiates," and thus untrue to the deeper spirit of its own standpoint.

As a matter of presentation it is unfortunate that the authors do not connect the discussion of pragmatism more closely with the results of the preceding exposition. As they themselves admit in the preface, this omission detracts appreciably from the unity of treatment. The basis for the charge against pragmatism, it seems, is the fact that the latter has formed entangling alliances with immediatism. While pragmatism is right in its emphasis upon functionalism, its most prominent advocates have all professed their adherence to some form of immediatism. This creed is not only inessential to pragmatism as such, but is incompatible with its deeper meaning, for it introduces once more the attempt to base our thinking upon a 'simple element' or 'given.' A starting-point of this kind necessarily leads to perverted notions regarding the nature of thought. In effect it means that relations once more become external, as appears most strikingly in Professor James's contention that "the self-same piece of experience taken twice over in different contexts" is equivalent to the distinction between knower and known. The relations are treated as merely additive, *i. e.*, as exerting no influence upon the character of the experience. Essentially the same criticism applies to the pragmatic treatment of concepts. While it is true that concepts necessarily have reference to conduct, it does not follow that the nature of the concept is exhausted in any direct and 'external' relation of the given experience to a specific form of conduct. The relation of the concept to conduct is more indirect and equivocal. "From the standpoint of biological utility it is clear that the object, so far from meaning a definite type of behavior, is recognized as an object only as it is associated with important diversity of behavior in characteristically different situations" (p. 168). In other words, the concept is of necessity more inclusive than any given type of behavior. The concept cannot be identified with any conscious process, however complex, for "the group of associations which constitutes the concept may never in its entirety be present to consciousness in any single experience" (p. 170). It follows, furthermore, that "apart from this reference of thought to conduct, that is to say, in the limitless interrelations of concepts with each other, thought has as distinctive a form as any abstractly considered entity whatsoever" (p. 207).

The gist of the matter, then, as regards current pragmatism, seems to lie in the proposition that functionalism may be divorced from immediatism. On just this point, however, the position taken in the book does not seem to be altogether consistent. In the discussion of J. S. Mill's theory of objectivity (pp. 173-185), it is pointed out that Mill's fundamental mistake lies in the fact that he takes simple elements of sensation as his starting-point. These elements are held together by connections which Mill regards as 'real' but as inexplicable. The alternative proposed by the authors is that sensation is a scientific construct, that the distinction between sensations and relations is simply a matter of logical analysis. In other words, the relations fall within the experience quite as much as do the sense-elements. This is only another way of saying that objects are immediately presented—however we may see fit to interpret objectivity. Earlier in the chapter, however, the distinction between the 'given' and its relations is drawn in quite as hard and fast a way as was ever done by Mill. A passage was quoted in the preceding paragraph to the effect that the concept is never in its entirety present to consciousness in any single experience. So far as the exposition goes, there is no ground for the belief that it is ever present to any degree or in any intelligible sense whatever. On page 171 the question is raised: "How, indeed, can given conscious contents 'represent' or 'mean' or 'point to' other possible contents not given?" The answer which is suggested is that there is a tendency on the part of the associated experiences to rise to clear consciousness, and that "such inhibited tendencies to revival may affect in a distinctive manner the qualitative tone of the existing content." Such an explanation obviously fails to explain. We must either identify the concept with these nascent associations, which is incompatible with the general account given of the concept, or we are forced to recognize that the tendencies in question can, at most, effect a change in the quality or structure of what is presented or experienced, a change which may perhaps be interpreted as corresponding to the function, but which is in no sense identical with it. In other words, the relations or functions, regarded as such, necessarily fall outside the experience. That this is the intention is evidenced by the general tenor of the book, and in particular by the avowed agreement on this point with Berkeley and by the assertion that the 'real' is never experienced but always remains ideal.

The implication of the foregoing, it is evident, is that *Dogmatism and Evolution* is itself in bondage to the tradition which it accuses pragmatism of perpetuating. It is committed to the very opposition of universal and particular which it charges against the "immediate empiricism" of Professor Dewey (pp. 244, 246). In the end, the denial of immediatism is purely verbal, for the relations or meanings which are necessary to constitute things are opposed to what is 'given.' Hence we have the assertion that the 'real' is 'never immediately experienced at all; it is always ideal' (p. 245). This charge, however, is significant, for it seems to indicate the source of the trouble. The immediatism attributed to Professor Dewey is essentially that of the older empiricism—the immediatism which constitutes a contrast to all forms of interpretation or mediation. It is urged, for example, that immediate experience can contain no uncertainty and doubtfulness; also that the Zöllner lines cannot be immediately experienced as convergent,—the reason in the latter case being that convergent lines are lines which when extended meet in a point, whereas the lines in question do not meet unless *conceived* as extended. In other words, if the lines are conceived as extended, the experience is held to be no longer immediate. The point of Dewey's contention, however, is that both the immediate and the mediate of ordinary philosophical usage are enveloped in a wider immediacy, and that this immediacy is meant when the assertion is made that things are what they are experienced as. Moreover, as Pro-

fessor Dewey says, this proposition is not identical with the platitude that experience is experience, but has the significance of a method of philosophical analysis. If mediation is itself immediately experienced, the proper way to find out its nature is to observe its operations as they occur, instead of applying the mediation *ab extra*, as has been done so frequently in the past.

In brief, then, it would seem that if the function and content of concepts are not immediately experienced, we are back at the standpoint of Mill, and left to derive what comfort we can from the classification of a contradiction as an 'ultimate mystery.' On this ground, moreover, we seem compelled to choose between the alternatives offered by Professor Royce, viz., a validism of Mill's type, and a world which is the embodiment of an "absolute system of ideas." At all events, we can hardly be content to say merely that the real is always ideal. On the other hand, if mediation is directly experienced, there seems to be no ground for identifying the real with something beyond experience or with any particular kind of experience. One experience is then, to all appearances, as real as another.

In conclusion the reviewer may be allowed to say that since limitations of space do not permit comment upon the many excellent discussions contained in the book, the foregoing criticism may well seem disproportionate, in view of the many solid merits of the work. But disagreement, even though pretty fundamental, is entirely compatible with sincere respect and appreciation. Readers who remain unconvinced by the third part will nevertheless find the work one of distinct and unusual ability, a work that will abundantly repay a careful reading.

B. H. BODE

University of Illinois

Manual of Mental and Physical Tests. By GUY MONTROSE WHIPPLE, PH.D.
Baltimore, Warwick and York, 1910. pp. ix, 534.

This manual includes a description of the apparatus and method of administration of fifty-four tests or groups of tests, a series of accounts of the chief results obtained by those who have used them, and a corresponding series of bibliographies. There is also a summary of the formulæ and tables useful in calculating central tendencies, variabilities, reliabilities and correlations from the obtained measures.

Eighty pages are given to means of measuring height, weight, head-shape and size, breathing capacity, and muscular strength, speed, precision and steadiness. The next ninety pages concern tests of sensory capacity. Under the headings 'Tests of Attention and Perception' and 'Tests of Description and Report,' we have, in the next ninety pages, carefully elaborated forms of tests in perceiving letters, words, etc., exposed by the tachistoscope, in cancelling words, letters, etc., printed amongst others, in counting dots, in reading, in adding a one place number to three given numbers in succession, in simultaneous reading and writing, and in describing and passing a detailed examination upon objects. A fourth portion of the same length covers tests of association (thinking of a word, of a word to fulfill certain requirements, and of the facts needed for simple computations), learning (to copy drawings seen in a mirror and to translate certain characters into numbers with the aid of a 'dictionary' printed on the blank), and memory (of series of digits, letters and words, and of passages). Finally, in somewhat over a hundred pages we find tests of suggestibility, imagination, invention, intellectual equipment, and developmental diagnosis. These include, often in improved forms, the size-weight illusion, Binet's other tests for suggestibility, tests of the effect of suggested warmth, Dearborn's ink-blot test, the familiar school tasks of including given words in a sentence, completing sentences and writing compositions, word-building from given letters, the Ebbinghaus 'Combination' test, Swift's interpretation of fables, Kirkpatrick's test of knowledge of the meaning of words,